A single paper was pinned up in the tavern, hand-written in neat but hurried script:
A MEDITATION ON WELL-BEING AND THE MORALITY OF RACISM
Isaak Darkäfen
Isaak Darkäfen
———
RACISM - The treatment of one race as lesser than another due only to being of that race, or holding characteristics intrinsic to that race as a result of being of that race.
———
Preface
Racism is correctly claimed by many to be an essential cornerstone of the Regalian way of life, for without racism there could be no Class system; no slavery; and, in the eyes of the devout, no entry to Paradise. For this reason the moral acceptability of racism is assumed; for upon this dogma (among others) Regalian society leans heavily. However, such dogmas MUST NOT go unquestioned. In the pursuit of progress no conviction may remain undoubted, if only in that once doubted, they may be proven true and leaned upon all the more heavily. In order for progress to be made; in order for the people of Regalia, nay, ALORIA, to advance, their convictions must be doubted many times over until there CAN BE NO DOUBT of their absolute truth. Now that such a conviction is being leaned upon so heavily to justify the actions of the Black Regiment, it is of the utmost importance to insure that racism is justifiable in itself.
I. The Value of Well-Being
To be sure, the Well-Being (that is, the moral, emotional, physical health and to a lesser extent contentedness and general happiness; the state of Being Well) of all sentient beings has a certain moral value. To demonstrate: it would be morally wrong to, upon meeting on the street a young Ailor lady, bludgeon her with a stick. It is wrong for the reason that it harms her Well-Being; it bruises her delicate body, and causes her great distress and fear. Moreover, it would not be any more morally acceptable if the one bludgeoning the other extracted enjoyment from the act - the lady's Well-Being is diminished by far more than the beater's is augmented.
II. Being Well in Death
It can easily be asserted that in death no non-human can Be Well, for they are always reincarnated (in which case they are not dead any longer) or simply die (in which case they do not exist in order to feel distress, or be harmed physically). Humans can Be Well in death, as they are able to join the Spirit.
II. Moral Destruction of Wellbeing
On the other hand, the value of the Well-Being of a dangerous Human Aberrant may be lesser than the value of the collective comfort of the victims which it will undoubtedly harass, and certainly the lives that it may extinguish. In such a case the Well-Being of the Aberrant may be sacrificed ONLY as a preventative measure¹, and similarly in the case of a murderer. Should the Human not be an Aberrant, there would of course be no adequate reason to destroy their Well-Being or life, and therefor, in so doing one would be acting immorally. Thus, it is only by directly endangering the Well-Being of others that the endangerer, similarly to the Aberrant, grants the moral right to diminish the endangerer's Well-Being.
¹ preventing the Aberrant from diminishing the Well-Being of others by attacking them directly or deluding and misleading them, corrupting their morality with its Demonic nature and leading them from the Great Way.
III. The Commonality of Well-Being
Should a Human wandering in his house stub his toe on a table leg, he would feel pain. Is there any adequate reason to believe that this pain would be any more or less intense had he been an Altalar? Similarly, if a Human child loses her favourite toy, would she feel any more or less anguish than if she had been a Maraya, an Allar, a non-Human? The answer is of course no². Humans and non-Humans suffer in the same ways and to the same degrees. Similarly, they can Be Well in the same ways and to the same degrees (while living). Therefor, as non-humans and humans suffer in the same ways and to the same degrees, the Well-Being of each must be of the same nature. Well-Being is a trait of a sentient being, not of a non-human or human, as it is clearly existent in all sentient beings and is no different from species to species.
² though a Varran child may have less of an interest in toys, this difference is purely cultural or personal. In the same way, a Velheimer child may have less of a connection to his toys than an Ithanian. This cannot mean that the capacity and nature of their Well-Being is different fundamentally, only that it is augmented and diminished by different things.
IV. CONCLUSION
If Well-Being is the trait of a sentient being, not of a Human or non-Human, and if it is the same across all Races, then how can it be more valuable in one case or another? The Well-Being of a Maraya is the Well-Being only of a sentient being, and so too is that of an Ailor. If this is true, how can they have a different moral value? Can two things of the same nature - nay, can two IDENTICAL actions be of different moral values? Of course not. Similarly, it seems that the Well-Being of the Ailor and the non-Ailor must be of the same value. Therefor, in diminishing the Well-Being of any sentient being, one diminishes one's own Well-Being in acting immorally.
V. On Superiority
The innate superiority of Humans has no effect on the relative value of their Well-Being on a basic level. Humans may be superior, but this does not give them the moral right to abuse non-Humans without good reason (see II).
Any reasoned questions or objections will be addressed on a later paper.